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THE SUPPORT LAW AND THE EQUAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA
The law has long recognized the family as the basic social and
economic unit of civilization's complex structure.' Embodied in
the legislature and the courts, the law has been striving over the
centuries to preserve the concept of the family by enforcing the
rights and correlative duties of its members so that it might best
perform its function within our cultural organization. To accom-
plish its goal, it is necessary that the basic family remain a finan-
cially feasible unit, and to this end the law has evolved a system
wherein certain members of the family become liable for the
support of other members. Legislators and courts have chosen to
assign duties and rights to support on the basis of sex. 2 The as-
signment has distinct advantages. It is easy to administer, clearly
definable and unilaterally enforceable. It reflects a traditional
and accepted vision of the family that status within its structure
and behavioral roles be determined by sex.
3
On May 18, 1971 the people of Pennsylvania voted to amend
Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to include section 27.
4
The new amendment has been called the equal rights amendment
and it reads:
Prohibition Against Denial or Abridgement of Equality of
Rights because of Sex. Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.5
1. The courts have long declared themselves the protectors of the
state's interest in family relationships. For a recent case where this state
interest is verbalized, see Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972).
2. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4731 (1963), § 4733 (Supp. 1972);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1151 (1964).
3. See J. REED, PENNSYLVANiA BLACKSTONE, VOL. I (1831):
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being, or legal existence of the woman, is suspended
during the marriage, or, at least, is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband .... Upon this principle of a union of
person, husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights,
duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.
Id. at 221.
For a mare modern discussion of this concept, see United States v.
Yasell, 388 U.S. 341 (1966), particularly the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Black at 361.




The new amendment is likely to call into question laws which ap-
proach regulation of family affairs from the point of view that
status within the family is predetermined by sex. Already the
ancient and entrenched law of support has been brought under
review to be tested by the terms of the equal rights amendment. 6
This Comment will examine the force of Article 1, section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution on the existing body of support law.
Since the central issue is the question of the legal relationship of
one sex to the other in marriage, the discussion herein will be
limited to the obligations existing between husband and wife. In
order to give the most simplified view of the area, variations on
this most basic family theme will be touched on only collaterally.
I. DEVELOPING ThE SUPPORT LAW
Initially, the burden of the obligation to support a family fell
on the shoulders of the husband and father. 7 The common law
found a moral duty for a man to support his wife and early statutes
soon spelled that obligation into written law." Additional statutes
and amendments to existing statutes have, over the years, served
to bolster and assist the basic common law rights to support.9 The
courts continue to speak in terms of a husband's legal and moral
obligation to provide for his family as it was originally viewed at
common law.10
The courts' selection of the man of the family as the logical
party to bear the brunt of its finances was not entirely arbitrary.
Women under the common law were severely disadvantaged to the
point where they were virtually unable to provide adequately for
themselves, let alone others." Those legal disabilities which
6. Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
7. This has been the law of long standing duration and it has obtained
to a greater or lesser degree in all jurisdictions. See generally Brown,
Emerson, Falk and Freeman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Consti-
tutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 944 et seq.
(1971). For a rough history of the rationale of this custom in Pennsylvania,
see Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
8. Commonwealth v. Nathans, 2 Pa. 138 (1846). The court inter-
preted the Act of June 13, 1836, PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 62, § 1981, relating to
desertion and nonsupport of wives by husbands and of children by parents
of either sex.
9. Clark v. Clark, 17 Pa. D. & C. 500 (M.C. Phila. Co. 1932):
The act of May 23, 1907, P.L. 227 being in aid of a well-established
common law right should be liberally construed particularly in the
light of its just and beneficient purpose.
Id. at 503. The act referred to is in force at present, slightly amended, in
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
10. E.g., Walbert v. Farina, 411 Pa. 400, 192 A.2d 404 (1963).
11. For review of some of women's legal disabilities under the common
existed for women when the support law first evolved have been
largely alleviated,' 2 but the basic support law defining the husband's
duty remains unchanged. Its intent is to provide for the support
and maintenance of the man's wife and children. 3 The family
is entitled to a reasonable allowance that is consistent with the
husband's income and their station in life. Also the courts candidly
recognize the state's particular interest in the well-being of its
citizenry due to its financial investment in terms of public assis-
tance for those unable to support themselves. Thus it is not the
least intent of the law to save some part of what is expended by
the state in subsidizing families in which the man has in some way
failed in his responsibility.'
4
In return for the benefit of lifelong support in marriage, the
wife was deemed to owe certain duties to her husband. Her ser-
vices, as correlatives to his duty to support, were originally quite
heavy, but although not completely abrogated, in recent years they
have been reduced to a more tolerable load. For example, in the
last century all a wife's earnings were considered to belong ab-
solutely to her husband no matter how she obtained her income
or how he saw fit to spend it.' 5 This situation has since been cor-
rected by the Act of June 3, 1887,16 but the courts still mention the
household services the married woman is obligated to perform
in order to justify her husband's support. "The husband, of course,
is bound to support his wife, but only in accordance with his means;
and the wife, living with her husband and claiming support, should
in turn perform her wifely duties."' 7  The wife's marital obliga-
tions are primarily left to the imagination although courts will
refer on occasion to "the solemn vows and promises mutually
made.118 The one duty that is clearly defined in Pennsylvania and
other jurisdictions is that of the wife to live in the home that her
law, see Reed, PENNSYLVANIA BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 221 et seq. See
also, M. Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights under
the Constitution, 5 VALP. L REv. 281 (1971).
12. See M. Griffiths, The Law Must Reflect the New Image of Women,
23 HAST. L.J. 4 (1971) for a discussion of some more recent court decisions
improving women's legal status.
13. E.g., Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967); Kallen
v. Kallen, 200 Pa. Super. 507, 190 A.2d 175 (1963); Hyle v. Hyle, 188 Pa.
Super. 20, 145 A.2d 889 (1958).
14. See, e.g., Estate of Worell, 61 Pa. 105 (1869). For a more modern
view see Comm'r. v. Rankin, 280 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1959).
15. E.g., Appeal of McDermott, 106 Pa. 358 (1884); Appeal of Speak-
man, 71 Pa. 25 (1872).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 34 (1965) (married women entitled to
their separate earnings).
17. Austin v. Austin, 282 App. Div. 493, 124 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1953). For
Pennsylvania's requirement of marital obligations, see Clark v. Clark, 17
Pa. D. & C. 500 (M.C. Phila. Co. 1932). Wifely duties are not compensable
since the relationship of the wife as a housewife in the household of the
husband is not one of employment. Freppon v. Hittner, 91 N.J. Super. 9,
218 A.2d 890 (1966).
18. Austin v. Austin, 282 App. Div. 493, 496, 124 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902.
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husband provides for her, in the place of his choosing.' His
choice is controlling as long as it is made in good faith, and the wife
is constrained to move wherever his work, his comfort or even his
convenience requires2 0 in order to perform her services and regale
him with her society.
21
A. The Major Statutes
The bulk of support law as it is presently enforced is delineated
in numerous statutes which attempt to deal with the situation from
every conceivable point of view. They are overlapping and redun-
dant, and they provide a multitude of remedies of greater or lesser
effectiveness for the selection of the injured party. A husband's
primary obligation of support and a wife's right to receive main-
tenance are set forth both civilly and criminally in no less than four
major statutes. 22 The civil statute which defines the right of action
for support and maintenance begins:
If any man shall separate himself from his wife or children
without reasonable cause, and, being of sufficient ability,
shall neglect or refuse to provide suitable maintenance
. . . action may be brought .... 2
It has been held that the obligation is assumed as an incident of
marital status and cannot be avoided by separation. 24 The suf-
ficiency of the husband's ability is not necessarily measured by his
actual income where the court finds that it does not reflect his
capacity to earn. Thus in one case, a husband was not excused from
supporting his wife even though he was drawing no salary while
working for his parents, since as a pharmacist he could be ex-
pected to find a more financially rewarding position elsewhere.25
If the wife is forced to deplete her private estate in supporting her-
self when her husband fails to provide, he must reimburse her ex-
penditures.26 The law imposes a quasi-contractual relationship to
repay the wife or any other party who by supplying the wife with
19. E.g., Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965);
Commonwealth ex rel. Fernandes v. Fernandes, 202 Pa. Super. 542, 198
A.2d 425 (1964).
20. E.g., Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. 309, 208 A.2d 902 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Eldridge, 38 N.J. Super. 509, 11 A.2d 483
(1955).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4731 (1963), § 4733 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 1151 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
23, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
24. E.g., Samuels v. Hirz, 189 Pa. Super. 492, 151 A.2d 640 (1959).
25. Commonwealth ex rel. Wieczorkowski v. Wieczorkowski, 155 Pa.
Super. 517, 38 A.2d 347 (1944).
26. Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d 389 (1952).
items necessary for her maintenance has conferred a benefit on the
erring husband.
27
The criminal statutes relating to support cover much the same
substantive ground as the civil statute, providing redress for a wife
or family deserted or neglected by the husband. There are two
sections in the Criminal Code that set forth the husband's lia-
bility: 28 Section 4731, providing for punishment of the delinquent
spouse for his failure to meet his obligations, 29 and section 4733
which is intended not to punish but to secure a reasonable allowance
for the family's support.30 A support proceeding brought under
the latter section is held to be not a criminal prosecution but one
instituted under a quasi-criminal statute.3' The courts have found
that it is the intent of the legislature in this section to provide a
method by which a wife, deserted and deprived of support, could
seek assistance in securing a proper amount to preserve herself and
children in comfort. Of course, the civil remedy set forth in the
Marriage Law32 provides a method for accomplishing substantially
the same ends. By the quasi-criminal statute, the court is em-
powered to order the payment of an amount which it finds reason-
able for support of the family and to commit the defendant to prison
should the circumstances of the case demand such action. This
dual remedy is very popular with litigants and by far the largest
number of support actions are brought under this statute.33 Pro-
ceedings against a deserting husband can be maintained concur-
rently under sections 4731 and 4733, but under section 4731, which
is a criminal statute, the charge of desertion becomes a misde-
meanor.
34
Title 19, Criminal Procedure, 5 provides for more detailed
disciplinary action in a case of desertion and non-support. Section
1151,36 entitled "Power to commit to prison; payments on account
27. Id.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4731 (1963) (willful separation or non-
support) and § 4733 (Supp. 1972) (desertion and nonsupport).
29. E.g., Commonwealth v. Greene, 173 Pa. Super. 315, 98 A.2d 202
(1953).
30. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237
A.2d 181 (1967).
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Bundy v. Bundy, 159 Pa. Super. 153, 42 A.2d
537 (1946). See also Comm'r. v. Rankin, 270 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1959). The
differences between the civil and criminal remedy are discussed in this case.
As interpreted by this court the differences between the two actions were
partially based on the fact that they were brought in separate courts:
criminal nonsupport in the Court of Quarter Sessions and the civil action,
separate maintenance, in the Court of Common Pleas.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
33. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (Supp. 1972) and notes of numer-
ous decisions cited therein.
34. E.g., Commonwealth v. Widmeyer, 149 Pa. Super. 91, 26 A.2d 125
(1942).




of labor; security for compliance," again gives the court authority
to commit the defendant to prison, and at hard labor, should he fail
to give security for compliance when he was possessed of the means
to do so or likely to dissipate his assets or flee the jurisdiction. The
procedure is intended as punishment for contempt of court as shown
by defendant's failure to discharge his duty to his family.-7 There
is no provision within this statute giving the court authority to
make or modify a support order.
B. Proving the Right to Support
In order to bring any or all of these laws into action, a wife
must first prove her right to receive support. Whether she is
proceeding civilly or criminally, it is incumbent on the wife to prove
separation without reasonable cause or neglect to maintain. 8 The
language in the three statutes defining the duty is virtually identical
on this point. If the wife can show the husband has in fact deserted
her, she is entitled to such an award of support as the court deems
just and proper. Usually in a desertion case this presents very
little problem, however there are occasionally close cases. In
one instance, a husband spent his time away from home and slept
in a separate residence, but he continued to stop by the marital
domicile to drop off food and clothing of his choosing for his
family. The court found as a fact that such behavior amounted
to separation and that the wife was entitled to a cash payment for
support in order to purchase her own food and necessities, and that
of her family. 9
The husband's behavior can constitute "separation without
reasonable cause" without his actually moving out of the house: his
conduct could be so atrocious as to drive his wife away from him.
37. Commonwealth v. Peters, 178 Pa. Super. 82, 113 A.2d 327 (1955).
38. The three statutes relating to the husband's duty all agree that
the husband must separate himself from his wife or children without
reasonable cause or neglect to maintain them in order to give rise to
enforcement proceedings. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965): "If any
man shall separate himself from his wife or children without reasonable
cause, and .... shall neglect or refuse to provide reasonable maintenance
for said wife or children, action may be brought." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4731 (1963): "Whoever . . . separates himself from his wife or from his
children . . .without reasonable cause, or wilfully neglects to maintain
his wife or children. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (Supp. 1972):
"If any husband or father .. .separates himself from his wife or from his
children . . .without reasonable cause, or neglects to maintain his wife or
children .. "
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Iezzi v. Iezzi, 200 Pa. Super. 584, 190 A.2d
334 (1963).
This ploy does not defeat her right to support merely because it was
not the husband who literally deserted. She need only leave the
home as a result of conduct which would amount to "legal justi-
fication" for separation.40  She is not required to establish facts
that would entitle her to a divorce to claim such legal justification,
but must only show an adequate reason in law.4' If the husband
should consent to the wife's departure, even though she lacks
legal justification, her right to support continues.42 He may only
terminate that right by a good faith request for her return to resume
the marital relation.
43
The matter of desertion and non-support as described above, in
which the wife must prove separation without cause, comes fre-
quently to the court's attention. But the law contemplates another
class of cases by including in the statute a second provision written
in the disjunctive: "or neglects to maintain his wife or children
.... "44 Under either non-support section of the Criminal Code a
wife may successfully bring an action for support without proof
of desertion by depending on this phrase, provided she can show
neglect to maintain.4 5 Thus an action for support is occasionally
brought against a husband in the course of an ongoing marriage
where the parties are still living together as a family unit. Under-
standably, the courts hesitate to reach into the home and judicially
determine the household budget. In the words of one court "the
statute was never intended to constitute a court a sounding board
for domestic financial disagreements. . . .146 A justifiable fear can
be spotted behind the court's language that it would be pressured
into arbitrating the monetary disputes of families whose names are
legion, impinging the court's dignity and crowding its dockets.
This concern, however, has not stopped the Pennsylvania courts
from proceeding in such a case where it feels the facts warrant an'
order of support. Where neglect to maintain is clearly shown, the
fact that the parties are living together is no defense.4 7 A clear
showing of neglect generally requires proving a lack of the most
40. Darges v. Darges, 202 Pa. Super. 330, 195 A.2d 847 (1963).
41. Id. Legal justification for the wife's withdrawal has been recognized
in cases where the husband drank to excess and watched obscene films in
the basement. Darges v. Darges, 202 Pa. Super. 330, 195 A.2d 847 (1963);
where the husband made immoral advances to the wife's son, Doelp v.
Doelp, 219 Pa. Super. 420, 281 A.2d 721 (1971); or where he committed
such indignities to the wife as were "humiliating, degrading and incon-
sistent with her position and relations as a wife." Wick v. Wick, 352 Pa. 25,
28, 42 A.2d 76, 78 (1945) quoting from Donnelly v. Donnelly, 76 Pa. Super. 92,
95 (1921).
42. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel, Davidoff v. Davidoff, 178 Pa. Super.
549, 115 A.2d 892 (1955).
43. Id.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4731 (1963), § 4733 (Supp. 1972).
45. Commonwealth v. Peters, 178 Pa. Super. 82, 113 A.2d 327 (1955).
46. Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 123, 56 A.2d 228, 231 (1948).




basic necessities such as food, clothing or payment of rent and
utilities.
48
C. Losing the Right to Support
The right of a wife to support can be lost at any time. Upon
proof that the wife is unworthy of support, her right can be de-
feated before any order is entered or upon review of an order al-
ready in force.49 Conduct on the wife's part which would give the
husband sufficient grounds for a divorce justifies his refusal to
support her and constitutes the most widely used argument to defeat
her right." She is also considered unworthy if she has separated
herself from the husband's home and is unable to establish legal
justification for leaving or to prove her husband's consent.-" Penn-
sylvania law allows a wife to lose her right to support on yet another
ground: the entry of an absolute divorce decree.2 The divorce
law" makes no provision for permanent alimony where the parties
have obtained an absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony
and the courts have consistently held that no duty of support is
owed to a divorced wife by a former husband.4 Should a divorce
be obtained and alimony decreed in another state, Pennsylvania
courts will still refuse to enforce a support order where the parties
are effectively divorced."B
D. Rights and Liabilities Under Other Statutes.
The rights and duties of the wife and other family members
are not limited to situations where desertion or neglect have oc-
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peters, 178 Pa. Super. 82, 113 A.2d
327 (1955) where wife was required to take meals with friends and family
due to lack of husband's support; Commonwealth v. Gauby, 64 Berks 54
(Pa. C.P. 1971) where "another woman" was involved who received presents
from the defendant while he failed to provide food, clothing, and incidentals
to his family.
49. Commonwealth ex tel. McCuff v. McCuff, 196 Pa. Super. 320, 175
A.2d 124 (1961).
50. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McCuff. v. McCuff, 196 Pa. Super. 320,
175 A.2d 124 (1961); Commonwealth ex tel. Davidoff v. Davidoff, 178 Pa.
Super. 549, 115 A.2d 892 (1955).
51. Commonwealth ex tel. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 204 Pa. Super. 135, 203
A.2d 369 (1964).
52. E.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Jones v. Jones, 216 Pa. Super. 1, 260
A.2d 809 (1969). See also Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 187 A. 245
(1936) for history and development of the statutes relating to divorce
and alimony.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-98 (1955).
54. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
55. Comonwealth ex Tel. Bortin v. Bortin, 210 Pa. Super. 355, 234 A.2d
55 (1967).
curred. Further rights are established for the wife in two sections
of the divorce law. Title 23, section 46 provides "[i] n case of divorce
from the bonds of matrimony or bed and board, the court may . . .
allow a wife reasonable alimony pendente lite and reasonable coun-
sel fees and expenses." 56 This action is different in character from
an order of support since its purpose is not one of maintenance.
5
T
Rather it is intended to provide a woman with the necessary
financial backing to prosecute or defend a suit until a final decree
is entered. 58 A wife might also sue for a divorce from bed and
board 9 and obtain what is essentially a legal separation 60 with the
husband's duty of support still intact.61
There is only one situation in Pennsylvania where permanent
alimony is allowed and it is available to either spouse. In the
case where a spouse obtains a divorce from an insane husband or
wife, the court can decree alimony for the support of the insane
spouse for the term of his natural life. 2 Also available to any
family member is the statutory remedy 63 providing that "[tihe
husband, wife, child ... father and mother of every indigent
person, whether a public charge or not, shall, if of sufficient finan-
cial ability, care for and maintain or financially assist, such in-
digent person .. ,,14 By the terms of this statute either spouse
has a duty to support the other if one should be rendered indigent
and one remain financially able to maintain him. If any local
public assistance program assumes this burden, the defaulting
spouse is liable to reimburse that program up to the amount ex-
pended in financial assistance.6 5  This liability, of course, is not
as extensive as the husband's primary obligation to support his
family, but arises only when a party is indigent and in the way to
becoming a public charge.
Throughout this tangle of law and common law and overlapping
statutes relating to support the courts have chartered a course en-
forcing the defaulting spouse's duties according to the facts of each
separate case and using a good deal of judicial discretion. In the
midst of the verbiage surrounding the law, two statutory areas
stand out as being of great practical value. These are the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act6 6 and the Pennsylvania
56. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1972).
57. Belsky v. Belsky, 196 Pa. Super. 374, 175 A.2d 348 (1962).
58. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 32 A.2d 921 (1943).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955).
60. A legal separation does not exist as such in Pennsylvania, the only
remedy available to achieve this end being the divorce from bed and board.
61. For a review of the history and effectiveness of this remedy, see
the opinion in Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (1955).
63. PA. STAT. A"N. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973(a) (1968).
65. McGlothan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 72 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.1-30 (1968).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Civil Procedural Support Law.67 The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act has stated its purpose "to improve and
extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support
and to make uniform the law with respect thereto." 68  It serves
to enforce duties of support imposed by any state in which a
similar reciprocal law has been enacted.69 The Civil Procedural
Support Law provides a procedure for enforcing existing support
rights of dependents allowing for attachment of property and
earnings and conferring powers and imposing duties on the courts
uniformly throughout the various counties in the state.70 These
two laws were enacted as remedies "in addition to, and not in sub-
stitution" for any other proceedings for support.7 1 They changed
none of the existing law but they are quite capable of standing by
themselves and single-handedly accomplishing those remedies which
the profusion of support statutes under other titles now attempts to
cover.
7 2
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT AREAS
As it is presently stated, Pennsylvania's support law is open to
criticism in terms of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment.
The review set forth above brings to light court enforced liabi-
lities which fall with suspicious weight on one sex alone. Pre-
dominant is the fact that obligations for the support of the family
are primarily the lot of the husband-father, thus suggesting that
equality of rights under the law is somehow being abridged because
of the sex of the individual. The wife shares liability equally
with the man only when permanent alimony is awarded where the
respondent is insane78 and as among the relatives liable for the
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.31-44 (1968).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.1 (1968).
69. Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103
A.2d 430 (1954); Commonwealth v. Mexal, 201 Pa. Super. 457, 193 A.2d 680
(1963), in which the wife deserted to another jurisdiction and support was
nevertheless enforced on the grounds that the remedy does not depend on
the flight of the father, but upon a breach of duty to support which exists
without regard to residence of the parties.
70. Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Jones, 216 Pa. Super. 1, 260 A.2d
809 (1969).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.3 (1968) (remedies additional to
those now existing); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.33 (remedies additional
to those now existing).
72. In 1971 Illinois repealed that section of its laws providing for sup-
port of the family by the husband. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 50-59 (1959)
Support of Dependents. The repeal, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 50-59 (Supp.
1972) provided: "The subject matter of the repealed sections is now
covered by the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
section 101 et seq. of this chapter."
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (1955).
support of indigents.14  Also, and significantly, it should be noted
that despite the heavier burden placed on the male under the
statute both the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 75
and the Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Support Law 6 are drawn
without regard to sex.
The grounds necessary to establish desertion also differ be-
tween the sexes. A husband is found to have deserted, and is
therefore liable for support, if he leaves home without reasons
amounting to grounds for divorce.77 Grounds for divorce are
virtually his only defense to a support action before entry of a
valid divorce decree if he is the one who abandoned the marital
domicile.78 The wife, on the other hand, can leave home with
impunity and still retain her marital rights if she can prove reasons
for her separation that are adequate in law. There is no need for
her to prove grounds for divorce. 79 The discrepancy in the burden
of proof required for men and women in the same circumstance
to prove the same thing, desertion, creates a serious question as to
the legal validity of such a double standard of proof.s °
Another questionable interpretation of the law as defined by
the courts is the legal recognition of the husband as the head of
the household.8 ' Mr. Justice Black noted with some surprise the
prevalence of hangovers from the supposedly obsolete institution of
coverture in the dissenting opinion to a 1966 case:
Coverture . . . rests on the old common law fiction that the
husband and wife are one. This rule has worked out in
reality to mean that though the husband and wife are one,
the one is the husband. This fiction rested on what I had
supposed is today a completely discredited notion that a
married woman, being female, is without capacity to make
her own contracts and do her own business. I say "dis-
credited" reflecting on the vast numbers of women in the
United States in the professions. . . . It seems at least
unique to me that this court in 1966 should exalt this archaic
remnant of a primitive caste system to an honored place
among the laws of the United States.
8 2
However obsolete are the laws of coverture, the husband's right to
be boss in his household is universally honored8 1 This gives him
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.1-30 (1968).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.31-44 (1968).
77. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Iezzi v. Iezzi, 200 Pa. Super. 584, 190
A.2d 334 (1963).
78. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Davidoff v. Davidoff, 178 Pa. Super.
549, 115 A.2d 892 (1955).
79. E.g., Darges v. Darges, 202 Pa. Super. 330, 195 A.2d 847 (1964).
80. See Doelp v. Doelp, 219 Pa. Super. 241, 281 A.2d 721 (1971).
81. See notes 15, 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
82. United States v. Yasell, 382 U.S. 341, 351 (1966).
83. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N.J. Eq. 715, 120 A. 790 (1923) (husband's
discretion as to how his family lives is almost unbounded).
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the right to determine where8 4 and how the family lives, 5 within
a wide latitude of discretion. He forfeits the right when the court
finds he has been guilty of desertion, in which case he cannot
continue to determine exactly how family money is to be spents 6
From the legal enforcement of what might better be left a social
custom stems the case where a wife attempts by way of litigation
to improve her condition in the house. Some jurisdictions will go
to great lengths to avoid interferring in a marital relationship where
the parties remain living under the same roof, holding that there
is no legal basis for the claim.8 7 The husband is said to be ful-
filling his duty as long as the spouses are living together as hus-
band and wife.""
Pennsylvania does not suffer the married woman to be main-
tained in such straightened conditions. Where a wife was forced to
take her children to eat at the houses of friends, being without
resources herself after her hard work over the years had helped her
husband to amass a sizable nest egg, one court found neglect and
entered a support order although the household was at least super-
ficially intact.8 9 This is not the general rule for every case of a
parsimonious husband, however, and by no means are all petitioners
who balk at the humiliation of begging for grocery or clothing
money granted relief.90 The court appears reluctant to interfere
with the husband's domain. As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court: "[t]he method whereby a husband secures to his wife and
family the necessities of life is not a proper subject for judicial
review. . . ."9 As a practical matter the courts tend to note anti-
84. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Pitucci v. Pitucci, 200 Pa. Super. 591,
189 A.2d 912 (1963).
85. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Glenn v. Glenn, 208 Pa. Super.
206, 222 A.2d 465 (1966).
86. Commonwealth ex rel. lezzi v. lezzi, 200 Pa. Super. 584, 190 A.2d
334 (1963).
87. McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 126, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) The
facts of this case represent an extreme example of this attitude. Here an
affluent farmer insisted on keeping his wife in a home without plumbing
with a poorly functioning coal heater and old furniture. He failed to pro-
vide her with clothing and gave her no money for her own use. She,
however, more than performed her "wifely duties" working not only in
the house but in the fields with her husband. Her long suffering virtues
proved to be at least a part of her undoing. As the court denied her
support, insisting that to allow such an award required that the parties be
separated, it pointed out things couldn't be that bad since she had stood it
for thirty years of marriage.
88. Id.
89. Commonwealth v. Peters, 88 Montg. 196 (Pa. Q.S. 1967).
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Glenn v. Glenn, 208 Pa. Super. 206,
222 A.2d 465 (1966).
91. Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 124, 56 A.2d 228, 231 (1948).
social behavior of the man, and where matters of drinking, other
women or gambling are involved they are inclined to judge the
wife's petition with more leniency.9 2 It would seem that with the
new amendment the courts would at least be constrained to recon-
sider the man's primary authority in regard to the family's living
style.
93
In evaluating a wife's right to support there is one final area
where one sex sustains a heavier burden than the other. This is
the weight the court gives to the conduct of the parties in deter-
mining their rights and duties. As far as the man is concerned,
once it is determined that he failed in his duty to his family no
more consideration is given to his behavior. It is repeated that the
law's purpose is not to punish him for misconduct but to provide the
necessary support to his wife.9 4 On the other hand if the wife
fails to behave herself as a virtuous woman, she might lose her
right to support. Any conduct that would give the husband
grounds for divorce, occurring at any time before or after the
initial order is granted could cause the support necessary for her
maintenance to be withdrawn.9 5 Even if the husband is unable to
successfully maintain a divorce action on the grounds of the wife's
misbehavior due to his own conduct, the award will be denied her?6
Seemingly, wifely misconduct is being punished, while at the same
time the husband is expressly free from suffering judicial chastise-
ment for his misdeeds.
III. DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The support law clearly accords unequal treatment to married
people on the basis of sex alone. Proceeding on this premise the
issue presented it whether this treatment can be constitutional under
the terms of the equal rights amendment. The passage of constitu-
tional amendments and other legislation has from time to time
inspired a reconsideration of numerous state laws which have been
reviewed on similar issues.97 The courts have thus in the past had
sufficient practice to become somewhat adept at determining the
constitutionality of existing law.
92. Commonwealth ex rel. Glenn v. Glenn, 208 Pa. Super. 206, 211,
222 A.2d 465, 467 (1966).
93. The trend would appear to be away from judicial interference in
family matters at all. The rights to marital privacy have been recognized
in some private situations. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). However when there is a clear need for judicial regulation in
the less personal areas of finance, the equal rights amendment could cause
the court to put the parties on a more equal footing than in the past.
94. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel. Borrow v. Borrow, 199 Pa. Super.
592, 185 A.2d 605 (1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Liuzzi v. Liuzzi, 142 Pa.
Super. 239, 15 A.2d 738 (1940).
95. Commonwealth ex rel. Young v. Young, 213 Pa. Super. 51, 247
A.2d 659 (1968).
96. Commonwealth ex rel. McCuff v. McCuff, 196 Pa. Super. 320, 175
A.2d 124 (1961).
97. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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It has been suggested that the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution" should
accomplish or has already accomplished the same result in stemming
discrimination by sex as the equal rights amendment.9 9 It is true
that many prior advances on the front of sex discrimination have
been made with reference to the fourteenth amendment. 0 0 As a
result of these gains, however, there arises a distinct possiblity
that the language of the tests employed in the decisions will be
transferred to challenges brought under the equal rights amend-
ment. 01 The danger is that courts might adopt equal protection
concepts in deciding any cases touching sex discrimination without
regard to which amendment is being used as authority.
The courts have ruled that state laws which accord different
treatment to the sexes do not violate the terms of the fourteenth
amendment as long as they meet "a requirement of some rationality
in the nature of the class singled out.'
0 2
The prohibition against the denial of the equal protection
of the laws does not mean that a state may not recognize
differences and create classifications which are based on
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious or unjustly dis-
criminatory differences, or exist by virtue of the very
nature of the subject or persons being classified.
10 3
The requirement demands at the minimum that any statutory
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. A recent Supreme Court case dealing with the rights of
illegitimate children, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"0 4
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 "[Nor shall any state] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws ......
99. For a discussion supporting this point of view, see Corso v.
Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 83, 193 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
100. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Billed as the equal
rights case, this decision represents the first time the Supreme Court
grappled with the concept of sex discrimination under the fourteenth
amendment.
101. For a concise discussion of the two basic tests evoked for deciding
cases under the equal protection clause, see Comment, 76 DICK. L. REv. 160,
174-5 (1972).
102. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 210 Pa. Super. 156, 162, 232 A.2d 247,
251 (1967), quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). This case chal-
lenged the validity of the Muncy Act which provided for heavier sentences
for women convicted of the same crime as men. The court here decided
that the heavier burden on women was justified due to differences between
the sexes which could be related to the purpose of the legislature. The
decision was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the grounds
that the Act was devoid of reasonable grounds, but the "reasonable classi-
fication" test utilized was not disturbed.
103. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 648, 243 A.2d 400, 403 (1968).
104. 406 U.S. 164. (1972).
made clear that the states could not easily avoid the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment through the rational basis test as defined
above. When the state defined classification tended to impinge
sensitive, fundamental personal rights the Court announced its
intent to exercise a stricter scrutiny of the statute.101 In Weber,
the Court weighed the state's interest in regulating and protecting
the ligitimate family unit, a venerable state concern, against the
personal rights that were endangered by the classification, and de-
cided that whatever value the classification might have had, it was
far outweighed by the injury to those whose rights were affected. 10 6
The language in Weber reflects a certain liberal ease with which
the Supreme Court discards the restrictive classifications, but it
continues to adhere to the basic definition of an acceptable classifica-
tion.
It must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislature so all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.1 7
A challenged statutory classification, which the state can demon-
strate to a court's satisfaction falls within these guidelines, is al-
lowed to stand regardless of the rights of individuals adversely
affected. Should the reasonable classification exception as it is
delineated by the courts be applied to the equal rights amend-
ment as it was to the equal protection clause, much of the amend-
ment's contemplated force might be successfully deflected.
Two recent cases l10 have dealt with unequal treatment of the
sexes under the fourteenth amendment and found that rather than
reasonable the state endorsed classifications were arbitrary and
invidious. Lamb v. Brown0 9 overruled an Oklahoma statute which
defined a child who could enjoy the benefits of juvenile court as
any male under sixteen years or any female under eighteen. In al-
lowing equal protection to the males, the court discussed the clause.
The fourteenth amendment means "that no person or class
of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and under like circumstances." (citation omit-
ted). The general doctrine is that the amendment, in res-
pect of the administration of criminal justice, requires that
105. Id. at 172.
106. Id. at 173.
107. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972), quoting Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Here the Court finds unconstitutional a statute
which limits the acquisition of contraceptives to the class of married
people. The court did not deny the State's right to legislate that different
treatment be accorded different groups of people, but found the power was
curtailed when used to create classes on the basis of criteria wholly unre-
lated to the object of the Statute.
108. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Lamb v. 'Brown, 456 F.2d 18
(10th Cir. 1972).
109. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
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no different degree or higher punishment, shall be imposed
on one than is imposed on all for like offenses.11
The state contended that the discriminatory legislative judgement
was premised on "demonstrated facts of life,""' but since these
facts were not obvious or apparent to the court, the contention was
to no avail.
In Reed v. Reed' 2 an Idaho statute preferring men over women
to administer estates was held unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court rejected the state's contention that the classification was
reasonable because it eliminated areas of controversy thus making
administrating the selection of executors easier and avoiding a
possible hearing.
To give mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and what-
ever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intra-
family controversy, the choice in this context may not law-
fully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."
13
It is easy to imagine the use of a similar argument to justify the
support law as a reasonable classification. Yet even with the
reasonable classification exception, the fact that the courts reject
arguments such as this casts doubt on the validity of the discrimina-
tory support laws.
To some extent, the support law creates an imbalance of
burdens between the sexes to help correct prior existing social and
legal discrepancies. Some courts have upheld laws which are
discriminatory on the basis of sex in an attempt to correct some
such inequality persisting in the social structure. In Gruenwald
v. Gardner,"4 a social security law allowing certain women a
higher payment than men similarly circumstanced was upheld as
a classification "which is reasonable in relation to its subject and
is adapted in the interests of the community." 115 That the law was
favorable to women was considered justified by the provable fact
that women as a class earn less and have less opportunity in
higher age groups, and the law justly reflects, and corrects, eco-
110. Id. at 20 citing Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 678 (1895).
111. 456 F.2d at 20.
112. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
113. Id. at 254.
114. 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1968).
115. Id. at 592, quoting West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
391 (1937).
nomic facts of life. Protective legislation ostensibly passed to ease
for women the realities of the harsh working world fared less well
under the Civil Rights Act"' than did legislation such as that up-
held in Gruenwald under the fourteenth amendment. Recent cases
have consistently held that female protective statutes governing
employment practices could not be preserved under the Civil
Rights Act.117 It would seem that at least some ground has been
cleared in removing from the law statutes designed to protect
women, although it is by no means clear that such action has had
any decided effect on the state of support law.
A. Challenges in the Courts
The implications of the equal rights amendment have not yet
been tested by the higher courts of Pennsylvania. One support
case that reached the superior court footnoted a comment to the
effect that the court was not considering the force of the amend-
ment on the parties' rights at that time since the issue had not been
raised by counsel."" However, two recent cases from Allegheny
County and one from Delaware County have confronted the
challenge of the amendment. The first, Corso. v. Corso,1 9 de-
clared divorce from bed and board1 20 in violation of the equal rights
amendment in that it was a remedy available only to a wife, i.e.
woman. 1 In a lengthy and diverse opinion, the court reviewed
the origin of the divorce from bed and board, the changing and
developing position of women, the background of domestic rela-
tions law in general and both the federal and Pennsylvania equal
rights amendments. Numerous cases, commentaries, studies and
articles as well as many selections from the Congressional Record
are cited therein to substantiate the court's holding. The imbalance
in the divorce from bed and board remedy clearly abridged equality
of rights because of the sex of the individual, according to the
court, but the opinion also casts doubt on every other area of
domestic relation law, including support, 122 that endorses deter-
mination of rights, roles or liabilities by sex. Two months later
the same court handed down another decision, 123 this time de-
116. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such indi-
vidual's . .. sex....
117. See Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio Stat 2d 173, 281
N.E.2d 1 (1972) for a cogent analysis of the effect of the Civil Rights Act
on state law protecting females. See also Phillips v. Martin Marrietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542 for a discussion of the "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" interpretation of the Civil Rights Act.
118. Crissman v. Crissman, 220 Pa. Super. 387, 281 A.2d 719 (1971).
119. Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. L.J. 183 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
120. PA. STAT. AN N. tit. 23, § 11 (1955).
121. Corso v. Corso, 120 Pitts. LJ. 183, 197-8 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
122. Id. at 188.
123. Kehl v. Kehl, 120 Pitts. L.J. 296 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
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claring unconstitutional the wife's statutory right to alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees 124 on the grounds that it discrim-
inates against the husband on the basis of sex. The court cited
Corso as authority.
The only case which has dealt directly with the question of the
constitutionality of support is Lukens v. Lukens,12' decided in
September 1972. Here the court distinguished Corso and found
for the wife ruling that "a wife is not automatically entitled to
support just because she is a woman"'126 and that the law "does not
arbitrarily and capriciously operate to deny the equal rights of a
male or female solely because of sex, but realistically serves to
resolve a problem which arises from the relationship of mar-
riage." 2  The opinion begins with a careful and accurate discus-
sion of the principle of article 1, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
Sex alone is no longer a permissible factor in determining
the legal rights of women, or of men. . . The law may, of
course, impose different benefits or different burdens upon
different members of the society. But that differentiation
in treatment must rest upon particular characteristics or
traits of the persons affected. . . . Under the Equal Rights
Amendment the existence of such a characteristic or trait
to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classifica-
tion by sex rather than by the particular characteristic
128
After manifesting this clear understanding of the amendment's in-
tent and purpose, the court abruptly shifts to the reasonable class-
ification language used in interpreting the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
The prohibition . . . does not mean that a state may not
. . . create classifications which are based upon reasonable
and not arbitarary or capricious differences. . . . Thus, the
question before this court is: whether the Act of 1939 is
based upon a reasonable classification. 12 9
It appears from this statement of the issue that the court was not
considering the question raised by the equal rights amendment at
all, but was deciding the case on the basis of the fourteenth amend-
ment, thus bringing all that voluminous body of court decisions
into play as controlling precedent. An effort is made to show that
124. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Supp. 1972).





the law does not differentiate between the sexes at all, but only be-
tween husband and wife as parties to the marital contract. This
logic appears faulty at first glance since it is almost universally
accepted that the class of wives is entirely encompassed within the
class of women. It was clearly and commendably the intent of this
court to do justice in the given instance by providing support for
a needy wife. Where the parties were already in an unequal posi-
tion, the court sought to avoid further oppression of the woman by
interpreting the law in such a way that it would place them on an
equal basis. But it seems in pursuing this laudable goal the court
misapplies the law robbing the equal rights amendment of much of
its power and reducing it to the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
B. The Courts' Perrogatives
Appellate review of the equal rights cases could produce any
one of a number of results with regard to support law. The law
could be found constitutional and upheld as in Lukens, using argu-
ments of equal protection origin and manifesting a desire to equalize
what is essentially an unequal arrangement in marriage. On the
other hand the questionable support statutes could be held un-
constitutional and simply invalidated, rendering the statutes un-
enforceable as in Corso. This move does not shock the conscience
when an archaic divorce from bed and board statute is invalidated,
but some reaction might be expected should the concept of a hus-
band's duty to support his wife suddenly be stricken from the law.
A brief examination of the support law's effect, however, might
indicate that this change is not quite so drastic as it first appears
and fear of inflicting greater harm on financially dependent wives
is largely unfounded. The rights of these women are already un-
certain in Pennsylvania since they can be denied or lost upon proof
of the wife's misconduct or on the entry of a valid divorce decree.' 0
Frequently, when the award is allowed, the order is for an amount
so low that it represents merely a token gesture of satisfying the
law and does little toward maintaining the family. A Pennsylvania
judge was reported to say, "[t]he support court usually sets the
amount of a support order at the highest figure the defendant seems
capable of paying. Even then the amount is usually not enough to
support the wife and children on a minimal basis."'118 Further-
more, those support orders which are entered are poorly enforced.
Statistical data on collection of support money gathered in a study
in a metropolitan Wisconsin community was reproduced in the
130. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
131. Citizens Advisory Committee on the Status of Women, Washington,
D.C.,; The Equal Rights Amendment and Alimony and Child Support Laws,
Jan. 1972 at 7.
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Hastings Law Journal, November 1971.132 The chart reveals that
one year after the support order only thirty-eight per cent of the
fathers were still in full compliance, and at the end of ten years,
only thirteen per cent were still making regular payments. The
Philadelphia County Court Report Statistical Summary shows that
a nearly equal number of actions were filed to enforce unpaid ex-
isting support orders as there were actions to obtain support for the
year 1967.133 It thus appears that support orders present a somewhat
less than successful means of maintaining the dependent half of an
estranged family.
Perhaps invalidating those support laws which specifically
name the husband as bearing the burden alone would not have too
devastating an impact, particularly since these constitutionally sus-
pect laws do not represent the full range of remedies for support.
Recourse could still be had to those laws allowing support for
family members by others in the family as well as the Civil Pro-
cedural Support Law and Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act which both allow for enforcement of support actions with-
out regard to sex.
1 3 4
Traditionally the courts have not limited themselves to merely
upholding or invalidating questionable legislation. They have
shown themselves willing to extend the benefit of a law to classes
previously slighted,13 5 particularly when ruling on the effect of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.18 However
if this extension appears to the court as a judicial attempt to rewrite
the law, or to legislate what is essentially a new law, it is likely
to balk at expanding the law's benefits. Historically courts have
been unwilling to act affirmatively where substantial revision of
132. S. Nagel and L. Wutzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HAST. L.J. 171,
189-90. This study was based on data gathered by Kenneth Eckhardt from
a 1955 sample of fathers ordered in divorce decrees to pay child support.
See K. Eckhardt, Deviance, Visibility and Legal Action: The Duty to Sup-
port, 15 Soc. PROS. 470 (1968). The former article points out if noncom-
pliance in support for children is so great, it is probably still greater where
support for the wife only is decreed.
133. PHILADELPHIA CouNTY COURT REPoRT: STATISTICAL SUMMARY,
1967, 373, 386.
134. See notes 66-72 and accompanying text supra.
135. When the nineteenth amendment giving women the right to vote
was ratified, the courts extended the voting laws to include women rather
than invalidating what was such an essential area of legislation. For a
more detailed discussion of the concept of the court's willingness to extend
the benefits of a given law, see Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freeman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALR L.J. 874, 912.
136. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
the law is necessary. 137 In the case of support law, there would be
no requirement of extensive judicial redrafting to equalize its effect.
However, revising it to include both sexes would involve extending
a burden to one group, that of the wife, while benefitting the group
of husbands. The courts will rarely alleviate statutory discrimina-
tion if it means enforcing a new restriction or burden against a
previously excluded group, particularly if the statute to be ex-
tended is criminal,13 8
C. Possible Legislative Action
Action to bring the support law within the confines of the
equal rights amendment is not limited to the courts. Three pro-
posed House Bills have already been introduced before the General
Assembly of Pennsylvania. Bills number 2241139 and 2243140 would
change the civil support law,141 and the divorce from bed and board
statute,142 to read "spouse" wherever the present law has "husband"
or "wife" or like language specifying sex. Of course the effect of
such a change would be to give equal rights for support, and
shared liabilities, to both men and women in a marriage. Pro-
posed Bill number 2242148 is introduced to repeal section 4733 of the
Penal Code 44 which makes desertion and nonsupport a criminal
offense, thus eliminating any question of discriminatory wording.
One of the most sensible solutions to a host of problems in the
domestic relations area, including the support issue, is the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act 45 which is recommended for enactment
in all states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. Among other things, the proposed Act provides
for the division of property and maintenance in the event of separa-
tion or dissolution of marriage. Section 308, Maintenance, 146 pre-
sents a wise alternative to the present method of determining duties
and rights by allowing either spouse the benefits of support if the
financial condition of that spouse falls within certain guidelines.
The spouse seeking support must, first, lack sufficient property
137. This hesitancy dates back to United States v. -Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1825), and has been a continuing tradition with the courts.
138. E.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968)
challenged the constitutionality of the Muncy Act and the court, after
finding that women unjustifiably received heavier sentences than men,
extended the benefit of the men's more lenient law to women rather than
extending the women's harsher law to the males.
139. H.B. 2241, 156th Sess. (1972).
140. H.B. 2243, 156th Sess. (1972).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (1965).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955).
143. H.B. 2242, 156th Sess. (1972).
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (Supp. 1972).
145. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, Aug. 1-7, 1970 as amended, Aug. 27,
1971.
146. Id. § 308 at 36.
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to provide for his own needs and, second, be unable to support him-
self through appropriate employment or be the custodian of a child
whose condition requires the presence of the parent.
The section further provides that the award shall be as the
court deems just without consideration of marital misconduct of
either party. 147 This express admonition that the court should not
indulge in judicial chastisement of erring spouses by means of the
support order is stressed again in the comment following the sec-
tion. It solves the problem of discrepancies which have crept into
the existing laws that have granted or denied support payments on
the basis of the wife's behavior while declaring that a support
order was not intended as punishment for a defaulting husband.
The factors on which the amount of the award is based include
consideration of the resources of the dependent party, retraining
or education necessary to prepare for appropriate employment, the
condition of the marriage, and the ability of the supporting spouse
to provide.148 The well reasoned and fair intent of the section is
stated in the comment. It is designed to encourage adequate pro-
visions for the spouses by property division, and the support order
is only to be utilized in a case where the property is insufficient to
provide the spouse's needs.149 The Act also includes a provision
for the payment by one spouse for the attorney fees of the other
if the court should find such an order necessary. 01 Again, this
section does not base the award on the sex of the parties. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act seems to provide a fair and
reasonable way of bringing the complicated area of law dealing with
the formation and dissolution of family units into the purview of
the equal rights amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that among the numerous statutes dealing with
support in Pennslyvania, several discriminate between the sexes in
assigning rights and duties of maintenance. After a review of the
law it would seem that not only are these discriminatory statutes
unconstitutional, but the entire range of Pennsylvania's support law
is hopelessly confused in an unnecessary plethora of statutes, most
wrestling with substantially the same objective. Upon arriving at
this conclusion, the solution becomes obvious: restructure the law
147. Id. § 308(b) at 36.
148. Id. §308(b) (1)-(6).
149. Id. Comment to § 308 at 37.
150. Id. § 313.
to meet the requirements of the equal rights amendment, and while
so doing, revise and consolidate the whole body of support law into
a comprehensible unit. To produce the happiest result and still
meet the requirements of the amendment it would appear that the
scope of the law as it applies to married persons should be broadened
to include both sexes as recipients of the benefits of support.
This result, and that of pulling together the whole range of support
law, could only be achieved with any reasonable effectiveness by
legislative action. Without such action, the courts will be forced
into the uncomfortable position of either declaring the offending
support statutes unconstitutional and unenforceable or of allowing
them to stand and thus create precedent which weakens the impact
of the equal rights amendment making it virtually ineffective.
Should the legislature undertake revison of the discriminatory
sections of the law, it should take the opportunity to review the law
in its entirety. It is suggested that in so doing the use of appro-
priate sections of The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act as a
guide would aid in creating a law that is acceptable under the equal
rights amendment, yet still accomplishes the goal of the present
legislation by extending the remedy under the law equally to both
sexes.
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